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STATUS AND TRENDS IN STATE PRODUCT
LIABILITY LAW: COST-CONTAINMENT EFFORTS,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, EXPERT
TESTIMONY AND CONTINGENT FEES
INTRODUCTION
Because of the increased number and complexity of modern product
liability cases, legislators have been forced to seek ways to reduce the
number of cases that go to trial. Limiting the use of expert witnesses by
parties, capping attorneys fees, and providing alternative methods to
traditional litigation are ways in which U.S. jurisdictions have attempted
to deal with this problem.
This section will look at the burgeoning area of alternative dispute
resolution and how states are using new means to circumvent old problems
with traditional tort litigation. It then will discuss recent state experimen-
tation aimed at streamlining expert testimony in an attempt to save time
and cut adjudication costs. Finally, the section will look at state efforts
to reduce product liability action costs by limiting contingent fee recovery.
THE EXPANDING ROLE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
In order to deal with the combination of a larger number of cases
being litigated in the court system and the high cost of such litigation, a
variety of alternatives to litigation have been proposed and enacted. These
alternatives include arbitration, mediation, court-annexed arbitration, sum-
mary jury trial and private adjudication.
Arbitration
Arbitration is a contractual process by which parties to a controversy
or dispute refer the dispute to an impartial third person, selected by them,
who will make a determination in the case based on the evidence and
arguments submitted by the parties.' The decision of this third person is
final and binding upon the parties. 2 An arbitration award may be vacated
or modified, however, and the decision may be changed or appealed
through an adjudicatory process.
3
The cost advantage to arbitration is that, in most cases, decisions
reached through the arbitration process are final. An arbitration hearing
1. G. WILNER, DOMIE oN COMMERCIAL AaBRrATioN § 1:01 (rev. ed. 1984 & Supp. 1986). See
generally Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982) (an annual report on the
state of the judiciary, given by Chief Justice Burger to the 1982 midyear meeting of the American
Bar Association).
2. See G. WrNIER, supra note 1, at § 1:01.
3. See generally id.
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thus acts as an alternative to trial. A disadvantage to arbitration is the
procedural requirements, which must be agreed upon by the parties.
The Uniform Arbitration Act 4 has been adopted completely or with
modifications by a majority of states5 and integrated, with some changes,
into the statutes of other jurisdictions. 6 A number of these statutes
specifically exclude certain subjects, such as tort, insurance, sales and
consumer claims, from their scope of application.
7
Mediation
Mediation involves a neutral third party who is authorized to meet
with the parties and their representatives. 8 The mediator's role is to
encourage the parties to analyze and discuss issues, exchange views, and
resolve their problems without going to trial. 9 The mediator has no
authority to make decisions for the parties.' 0 In contrast to arbitration,
which is contractual, mediation is consensual." The emphasis in arbitration
is on persuading the arbitrator to decide in one's favor, whereas the
emphasis in mediation is on coming to an agreement between the parties.
When arbitration and mediation are not binding, they may not be a
cost-efficient alternative to litigation. If the parties do not enter the process
with a sincere desire to come to an agreement, however, arbitration or
mediation merely adds another step and additional cost to the litigation.
4. UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1955).
5. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.010 (Supp. 1983); ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1501 (Supp. 1982);
AR. STAT. ANN. § 34-511 (Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-201 (Supp. 1986); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5701 (1975); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4301 (Supp. 1979); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 658-1 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 7-901 (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, para. 101 (1975); IND.
CODE. ANN. § 34-4-2-1 (Burns 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679A.1 (West Supp. 1987); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4201 (West 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 5927 (1980). MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-201 (1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 251, § 1 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.08 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 435.350
(Vernon Supp. 1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.015 (Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7-
1 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.1 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 801 (West Supp.
1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7301 (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25A-1 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-302
(Supp. 1986); TEX. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 224 (Vernon Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-581.01 (Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. § 1-36-101 (1986).
6. See CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1280 (West 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-408 (West 1960);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.01 (West Supp. 1987); MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5001 (West 1987);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 542:1 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-1 (West 1952); N.Y. CIV.
PRAc. L. & R. 7501 (1980); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01 (Anderson 1981); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 33.210 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-1 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31-1 (1977); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 7.04.010 (1961); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 788.01 (West 1981); P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 32, § 3201 (Supp. 1985).
7. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
8. See Coulson, Alternative Dispute Resolution, TRI.AL, Oct. 1985, at 21, 21-22; Bedikian, Overview
of Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques, 65 MICH. B.J. 876 (1986) (discussing the major
methods of alternative dispute resolution, their implementation and soine of their advantages
and disadvantages).
9. See Coulson, supra note 8, at 22.
10. See id.
11. See Bedikian, supra note 8, at 879-80.
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Court-annexed Arbitration
Court-annexed arbitration involves the court's mandating, adminis-
tering and supervising an arbitration process for civil cases that are at or
below an established dollar amount. 12 The proceedings resemble arbitra-
tion, though they are held before a court-appointed body. 3 Unlike arbi-
tration, the awards are advisory in nature, although disincentives are built
into the system to encourage acceptance of the award. 14 The cost efficiency
of such a system depends on the number of cases that are resolved by
the court-annexed arbitration and do not go to trial. 5
Summary Jury Trial
The summary jury trial is the creation of the Honorable Thomas J.
Lambros, U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio.1 6 It
involves a non-binding jury trial, generally lasting one day. 17 The intro-
duction of evidence in such proceedings is limited, and witnesses are
excluded from the proceeding. 8 This format has been used in certain
federal district courts on an experimental basis in product liability and
personal injury cases, as well as in other areas of dispute. 9 This system
allows the advocates to present their cases to a six-member jury and
illustrates some of the realities of trial to the parties. 20 Though the jury
verdict is not binding, it may encourage settlement before a full trial is
required .21
12. See id. at 880. Jurisdictional amounts vary from a low of $3,000 in Alaska to $50,000 in
Minnesota and New Hampshire state courts. Some federal districts have even higher jurisdictional
limits. Michigan has no jurisdictional limits.
13. See id. at 880.
14. The disincentives may include assignment of arbitrator's fees (Arizona, Nevada and Pennsyl-
vania), or assignment of the costs of arbitration and/or trial costs if the trial results are not
more favorable to the party requesting trial (California, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio and
Washington). Id. at 880-81.
15. "If a large number of cases on the arbitration track go to trial, there is no substantial reduction
in the courts' caseload, and, correspondingly, no cost savings to justify arbitration." Id. at 881.
16. See Brenneman & Wesoloski, Blueprint for a Summary Jury Trial, 65 MICH. B.J. 888, 888-91
(1986).
17. See id. at 888.
18. See Coulson, supra note 8, at 21, 23.
19. Other areas of dispute using the summary jury trial method are employment discrimination and
civil rights violations, and contract and securities fraud cases. See Brenneman & Wesoloski,
supra note 16, at 888.
20. To ensure that this procedure fulfills its role in the settlement procedure, certain steps should
be taken: (1) the trial should be conducted with observance of certain formalities; (2) the clients
must attend the trial; and (3) after the jury's return of its advisory verdict, the members of the
jury should be made available to discuss the evidence and merits of the case with the respective
attorneys and parties. See Readey, Alternative Dispute Resolution-A Trial Lawyer's Primer,
53 INs. CoUNs. J. -300, 311 (1986).
21. See id. The summary jury trial may contribute to the settlement of a case, because it may offer,
the parties a realistic appraisal of the merits and value of their case, by receiving the jury's
advisory verdict. The verdict is based solely upon the evidence presented. This may stimulate
serious and realistic settlement negotiations.
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Private Adjudication
The private adjudication system provides an alternative to the public
court system. 22 The new forum will be presided over and decided by a
neutral party, often a retired judge. 23 The system, sometimes referred to
as "rent-a-judge," has been codified in several states.
24
Private adjudication offers advantages over a public court, such as
less public scrutiny, convenience to the parties in arranging the hearing,
ability to alter the rules of procedure, discovery and evidence, and
promptness of decision. 25 Potential problem areas, such as rules and
finality of the verdict, may be resolved in a binding agreement between
the parties and the judge.
26
TAKING CONTROL OF EXPERT WITNESSES
There were two traditional requirements for admissibility of expert
opinion at common law. 27 The expertise had to encompass matters suffi-
ciently complex to be beyond the knowledge of the ordinary lay person, 2
and the expertise could not be so novel or speculative that it was not
generally accepted within its recognized scientific or professional sphere.
29
Modern codifications of the use of expert witness testimony have relaxed
these limitations on the scope of expert testimony.
30
Federal court standards for the use of expert opinion testimony are
found in the Federal Rules of Evidence3' and in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 32 Many states have adopted these rules, or similar guidelines,
to assist the parties involved in dealing with expert testimony.3 3 Such
guidelines are necessary, because of the increased use of expert witnesses
at trial, and the potential importance of their testimony in today's complex
and highly technical product liability litigation.
Federal Rules of Evidence Jurisdictions
The Federal Rules of Evidence allow testimony by a witness qualified
as an expert if his or her knowledge will assist the trier of facts to
22. See id. at 309.
23. See id. at 309.
24. Id. at 303 n.20. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 638-45 (West Supp. 1987).
25. Id. at 309.
26. Id. at 309, 310.
27. Rossi, Modern Evidence and the Expert Witness, LITGATION, Fall 1985, at 19.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.; see also Pratt, A Judicial Perspective on Opinion Evidence, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 313,
316-19 (1982) (focusing on the practical aspects. of opinion evidence under Article VII of the
Federal Rules of Evidence).
31. FED. R. Evrn. 702-706.
32. Rule 16 provides the court discretion to schedule a pre-trial conference to consider certain
procedural matters, including the limitation of the number of expert witnesses. FED. R. Crv. P.
16(a)(4). Rule 26 describes the general principles governing discovery and limits discovery of the
opposing party's expert witnesses and the expected subject matter of their testimony to witnesses
whom that party expects to call at trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(1).
33. See Rossi, supra note 27, at 18.
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understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.34 Twenty-five"
U.S. jurisdictions3 6 have adopted Rule 702 verbatim, and six additional
jurisdictions have adopted substantially similar rules.
37
Federal Rule 703 lists the sources from which facts or data upon
which expert opinions are based may be derived.38 The facts or data need
not be admissible in evidence if they are "of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject . . .,39
Rule 704 allows opinion or inference testimony that embraces an
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact, if the testimony is
otherwise admissible. 40 Rule 705 allows an expert to testify in terms of
34. FED. R. Evm. 702. The Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 702 indicate that it is permissible
for the expert not only to give a dissertation or exposition of principles relevant to the case,
but the expert may also suggest the inference drawn from applying his or her specialized
knowledge to the facts. The scope of Rule 702 encompasses not only experts in the strictest
sense of the word, such as physicians or engineers, but also "skilled" witnesses, such as a
landowner testifying on land values. See generally 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE § 702 (1981 & Supp. 1986).
35. The rules of the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are evaluated along with the rules of
the 50 states.
36. See Asuz. R. Evan. 702; ARK. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, R. 702 (1979); COLO. R. EvrD. 702;
DEL. UNIF. R. Evm., R. 702; IDAHO R. EvrD. 702; IOWA R. Evn. 702; ME. REV. STAT. ANN.,
ME. R. EvrD., R. 702 (1978); MINN. R. Evm. 702; Miss. R. EVID. 702; MONT. R. Evm. 702;
NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-702 (1985); N.H. R. Evm. 702; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-702 (1986); N.D.
R. Evm. 703; Ono R. Evm. 702; OK.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2702 (West 1980); OR. REv.
STAT. § 40-410 (1985); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 19-15-2 (1979); TEX. R. EvID., R. 702; UTAH
R. Ev .702; VT. R. EvD. 702; WASH. R. EvnD. 702; W. VA. R. EvID. 702; WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 907.02 (West 1975); Wyo. R. Evm. 702.
37. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.702 (West 1979); HAW. R. Evm. 702; MIcH. R. Evm. 702; NEv.
REV. STAT. tit. 4, § 50.275 (1985); N.C. R. EvrD. 702; P.R. R. Evnm., R. 52-55.
38. FED. R. Evm. 703. The three possible sources for such facts or data are opinions based upon
first hand observation of the witness, opinions based upon hypothetical questions or upon
hearing facts as presented at trial, and opinions based upon data presented to the expert outside
of court and by means other than his or her own perception.
39. FED. R. Evm. 703. Twenty-five jurisdictions have adopted Rule 703 without change: ARIZ. R.
EviD. 703; ARK. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, R. 703 (1979); COLO. R. EvID. 703; DEL. UNIF.
R. Evm., R. 703; IDAHO R. EviD. 703; ME. REV. STAT. ANN., ME. R. Evm. 703 (1978); MINN.
R. Evm. 703; Miss. R. EvI. 703; MorT. R. Evm. 703; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-703 (1985); NEV.
RaV. STAT. tit. 4, § 50.285 (1985); N.H. R. Evno. 703; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-703 (1986); N.C.
R. Evrm. 703; N.D. R. Evid. 703; OaA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2703 (West 1980); OR. REV.
STAT. § 40-415 (1985); S.D. Comip. LAWS ANN. § 19-15-3 (1979); TEx. R. EvmD., R. 703; UTAH
R. EviD. 703; VT. R. EvrD. 703; WASH. R. Evm. 703; W. VA. R. Evm. 703; WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 907.03 (West 1975); Wyo. R. EviD. 703.86
Five additional jurisdictions have adopted rules similar in nature to Rule 703: HAW. R.
Evm. 703; IowA R. Evm. 703; MICH. R. EvT. 703; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.703 (West 1979);
P.R. R. Evnm. 52-55.
40. FED. R. EvrD. 704. This rule abolishes the former tendency to preclude witnesses from expressing
opinions upon ultimate issues. Most Federal Rules of Evidence jurisdictions have adopted a pre-
1984 version of Rule 704. These jurisdictions include: ARiz. R. EvnD. 704; ARK. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 28-1001, R. 704 (1979); COLO. R. EvTD. 704; HAW. R. EvlD. 704; IOWA R. EvlD. 704;
ME. REv. STAT. ANN., ME. R. EvTD., R. 704 (1978); MICH. R. EvIm. 704; MINN. R. EvID. 704;
Miss. R. EvlD. 704; MONT. R. EviD. 704; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-704 (1985); NEV. REv. STAT.
tit. 4, § 50.295 (1985); N.H. R. EVlD. 704; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-704 (1986); N.C. R. EVID.
704; N.D. R. Ev-n. 704; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2704 (West 1980); OR. REv. STAT. § 40-
420 (1985); TEX. R. Evm. 704; UTAH R. Evmo. 704; VT. R. EvID. 704; WASH. R. EvrD. 704;
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opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of
the facts or data underlying the opinion or inference. The court may
require otherwise, and in any event, the expert may be required to disclose
the facts or data underlying the opinion on cross-examination.
41
Under Rule 706, the court may appoint expert witnesses of its own
selection, as well as any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties. 42
Rule 706 also provides guidance concerning compensation of such wit-
nesses. This rule, allowing the option of court-appointed witnesses reflects
concern about the use of experts in modern litigation. By permitting the
court to appoint its experts, there may be a "sobering effect on the expert
witness of a party and upon the person utilizing his services. ' ' 43 This
could, in turn, decrease the need for the court to appoint its own
witnesses. 44 The failure by many states to enact Rule 706, in whole or
part, may reflect legislative desire to discourage court appointment of
experts .41
Expert opinion testimony as codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence
is often used in product liability litigation.46 Courts generally rule that if
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 907.04 (West 1975); Wyo. R. Evm. 704.
Six jurisdictions have adopted similar rules: DEL. UNET. R. EvrD., R. 704; FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.704 (West 1979); IDAHO R. EvrD. 704; N.H. R. Evm. 704; Omo R. EvID. 704; P.R. R.
EvlD. 52-55.
The 1984 version of F.R.E. 704 added a subsection that deals with expert witnesses testifying
with respect to the mental state of a criminal defendant.
41. FED. R. EvlD. 705. Seventeen states have adopted F.R.E. 705 verbatim: ARiz. R. EvlD. 705;
ARK. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, R. 705 (1979); COLO. R. EvYD. 705; IOWA R. EVrD. 705;
MICH. R. EvD. 705; MINN. R. EvID. 705; Miss. R. EvID. 705; MONT. R. EVID. 705; N.H. R.
Evrm. 705; N.D. R. EvmD. 705; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2705 (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 40-425 (1985); UTAH R. EvID. 705; VT. R. EvID. 705; WASH. R. EvID. 705; W. VA. R. EvD.
705; Wyo. R. Evrm. 705. Nine jurisdictions have adopted rules similar to F.R.E. 705: DEL.
UNIT. R. EvID., R. 705; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.705 (West 1979); ME. REv. STAT. ANN., ME.
R. EvID., R. 705 (1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-705 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. tit. 4, § 50.305
(1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-705 (1986); TEX. R. EvID. 705; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 907.05 (West
1975); P.R. R. EvID. 52-55.
Several states have rules that differ substantially from the federal rule. See, e.g., HAW. R.
EvrD. 705; IDAHO R. EvID. 705; N.C. R. EvrD. 705; Omo R. EVID. 705.
42. FED. R. EvID. 706. According to Rule 706, the court, on its own motion or on the motion of
any party, may enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed and
may request that the parties submit nominations. The rule explains an appointed witness' options
and allows for the expert's compensation. This rule also allows the court to authorize disclosure
to the jury that the expert is court-appointed. The rule specifically states that it in no way limits
the right of parties to call expert witnesses of their own selection.
43. FED. R. EvID. 706 advisory committee's note.
44. See id.
45. See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 34, at 706-28 (Supp. 1986). Only Arkansas adopted
the 1974 Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 706 verbatim: ARK. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, R.
706 (1979). Five jurisdictions-Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi and Utah-adopted
FED. R. EvID. 706 verbatim: CoLo. R. EvID. 706; MICH. R. Evm. 706; MINN. R. Evrm. 706;
Miss. R. EvID. 706; UTAH R. EVID. 706. Sixteen jurisdictions adopted rules similar to the Federal
Rule: Asuz. R. EvID. 706; HAW. R. EvID. 706; IDAHO R. EvID. 706; IOWA R. EvIr. 706; ME.
REV. STAT. ANN., ME. R. EvID. 706; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-706 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
11-706 (1986); N.C. R. EvID. 706; N.D. R. Evm. 706; S.D. CornN. LAWS ANN. § 19-15-2 (1978);
VT. R. Evm. 706; WASH. R. EvTD. 706; W. VA. R. EviD. 706; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 907.06 (West
1975 & Supp. 1986); WYo. R. EvTD. 706; P.R. R. EvID. 52-55.
46. See, e.g., Dildine v. Clark Equip. Co., 282 Ark. 130, 666 S.W.2d 692 (1984), in which the
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there exists "some reasonable basis" from which it can be said that a
witness has knowledge of a subject beyond that of ordinary persons, his
or her evidence shall be admissible as expert testimony.
47
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Jurisdictions
Jurisdictions that have not adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence
concerning expert witness testimony have taken a variety of approaches
to the codification of the use of such testimony. 4 Many states, including
some that use the Federal Rules of Evidence guidelines, follow the guidance
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 16, regarding the use of
pre-trial conferences to limit the number of expert witnesses at trial,49 and
Federal Rule 26, pertaining to discovery. 0 For example, Alabama follows
the Federal Rule guidance and has very general laws pertaining to the
appearance of expert witnesses5' and their testimony. 2 In contrast, Cali-
fornia has very detailed provisions for discovery, 3 as well as for the
appearance of experts and the nature of their testimony.
5 4
Supreme Court of Arkansas held that, under Rule 702 and Arkansas case law, a witness who
was academically qualified, who professed to have general and working knowledge of agricultural
machinery, and who had investigated and performed tests on similar machinery, was qualified
as an expert. 666 S.W.2d. at 693, 694. The witness could, therefore, give an opinion in a
product liability action against the manufacturer and distributor of a front-end loader that had
tipped and thrown its operator. Id. at 693, 694. The witness had a Ph.D. degree, a master's
degree in machinery design and was chairman of the engineering department at a state university
with which he had been associated for nearly 20 years. Id. at 693.
For further discussion, see generally Annotation, Products Liability: Admissibility of Expert
or Opinion Evidence that Product is or is not Defective, Dangerous, or Unreasonably Dangerous,
4 A.L.R. 4th 651 (1981 & Supp. 1986). For a specialized application of the use of experts in
product liability cases, see Messina, The Human Factors Expert in Tort Litigation, TRIAL, Jan.,
1984, at 38.
47. See, e.g., Dildine v. Clark Equip. Co., 282 Ark. 130, 666 S.W.2d at 694 (1984).
48. Georgia has codified the common law approach to expert testimony. This rule has been applied
in product liability case law. In Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 171 Ga. App. 331, 319 S.E.2d
470 (1984), a wrongful death action was brought by the parents of a minor child who died as
the result of a fiery blaze after a rear-end automobile collision. The Georgia Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court in allowing into evidence expert testimony concerning the design and
placement of the fuel system in the vehicle the child was in at the time of the accident. 391
S.E.2d at 474, 475. The court admitted such opinion evidence on the ultimate issue of negligence
because the issue would have been "beyond the ken of average layman," as codified under
Georgia law. Id. at 475.
49. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-116(b)(4) (1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0A, para. 218(a)(4)
(1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-216(5) (1983); Mo. REV. STAT. § 510.010(4) (1952); N.Y. Crv.
PRAc. LAw § 3036(5)(d) (1974).
50. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-126(b)(4) (1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-226(b)(4) (1983); LA.
CODE CIV. P. ANN. art. 1425 (West 1984); Mo. REV. STAT. § 510.010 (1952); N.Y. CrV. PRAc.
LAW § 3101(d)(l) (Supp. 1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 4003.5(a) (Purdon Supp. 1986). See
generally Maurer, Compelling the Expert Witness: Fairness and Utility Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 19 GA. L. REV. 71 (1984) (discussing the F.R.E. approach to the question
of judicial compulsion of expert witness testimony at trial).
51. ALA. CODE § 12-21-181 (1975).
52. ALA. CODE § 12-21-160 (1975). Several other states have similar provisions: GA. CODE ANN. §
38-1710 (1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IlOA, para. 220(d) (1984); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A,
Rule 19 (West 1960); VA. CODE § 8.01-401.1(1982).
53. CAL. CIrv. PROC. CODE § 2037-2037.9 (West 1978).
54. For rules dealing with expert testimony, see CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 720-723, 730-733 (1965).
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Two areas of special concern in product liability litigation are expert
witness qualification and competing expert testimony. Two of the primary
policy goals of product liability litigatiori-compensation of the injured
party and deterrence of further misconduct by the defendant-are not
served when counsel and the courts allow an unmerited expert opinion
into the record." Court decisions in product liability cases now provide
guidelines for attorneys who desire to introduce expert witnesses, in order
that the goals of the litigation may be best served.1
6
CUTTING INTO CONTINGENT FEES
The contingent fee system has been hailed because it "makes it
possible for anyone in our society to get the best lawyer." '5 7 It has been
criticized for being a cause of higher insurance premiums because the lure
of contingent fees may encourage attorneys to initiate unjustified litigation
and cause juries to inflate judgments in order to adequately compensate
victims 58
Much of the discussion about rules limiting contingent fees today
centers on medical malpractice litigation. 9 Some states, however, have
rules governing contingent fees in all personal injury litigation. 60 New
Jersey imposes a sliding fee scale on attorney fees. 61 This rule is intended
55. See Hoenig, Drawing theLine on Expert Opinions, 8 J. PROD. LIAB. 335, 338 (1985).
56. See id. at 345.
57. See Note, Medical Malpractice and Contingency Fee Controls: Is the Prescription Curing the
Crisis or Killing the Patient?, 19 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 623 n.10 (1985) (citing Kreindler, The
Contingent Fee: Whose Interests Are Actually Being Served?, 14 FORUM 406 (1979)). See generally
Annotation, Validity of Statute Establishing Contingent Fee Scale for Attorneys Representing
Parties in Medical Malpractice Actions, 12 A.L.R.4th 23 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
58. See Note, supra note 57, at 626.
59. See id. at 626 n.20.
60. New York and New Jersey have rules governing contingency fees in all personal injury litigation.
See N.Y. CT. R. § 603.7(e) (McKinney 1986); N.J. CT. R. 1:21-7 (West 1986). Both of these
rules have been held constitutional. A similar sliding scale fee proposed for all personal injury
litigation in Florida was held unconstitutional. In re Florida Bar, 349 So. 2d 630, 631 n.2 (1977).
See also ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-568 (1982); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West
Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6865 (Supp. 1984); HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-2 (1985)
(applies only to medical torts); IDAHO CODE § 39-4213 (1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-
1114 (Supp. 1986) (limited to medical malpractice actions); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.138 (West
Supp. 1987) (limited to medical malpractice actions); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 7-121b (1982) (limited
to actions against health care providers); NE. REV. STAT. § 44-2834 (1978); OR. REV. STAT. §
752.150 (Supp. 1977) (limited to medical, surgical and dental treatment); TENN. CODE ANN. §
29-26-120 (1980) (medical malpractice).
61. New Jersey court rules provide:
In any matter where a client's claim for damages is based upon the alleged tortious
conduct of another, including products liability claims, and the client is not a subrogee,
an attorney shall not contract for, charge, or collect a contingent fee in excess of the
following limits:
(1) 33 1/3% on the first $250,000 recovered;
(2) 25% on the next $250,000 recovered;
(3) 2001o on the next $500,000 recovered; and
(4) on all amounts recovered in excess of the above by application for reasonable
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to fix maximum permissible fees, 62 although it does not preclude an
attorney from charging or collecting a fee below the rule's limit.
63
The New York rule provides two "reasonable" fee schedules, either
one of which may be elected by attorneys and their clients in personal
injury or wrongful death cases. 64 Schedule A is a sliding fee scale; an
attorney who believes in good faith that he or she was inadequately
compensated by the amount allowed by Schedule A may request additional
compensation through a hearing process.65 Schedule B provides for a
capped, fixed percentage fee; the contracted-upon fixed percentage awarded
to the attorney cannot be appealed. 66
CONCLUSION
Increasingly complex product liability litigation requires increasingly
innovative alternative methods to the traditional jury trial. Alternative
dispute resolution methods provide cost-effective ways of resolving dis-
putes and are more efficient than jury trials. The trend is toward increasing
experimentation with, and adoption of, these alternative methods. Con-
tinued innovation will be necessary, unless more drastic curbs on product
liability litigation are enacted.
Robyn Harmon Marley*
fee in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (f) hereof; and
(5) where the amount recovered is for the benefit of a client who was an infant or
incompetent when the contingent fee arrangement was made, the foregoing limits shall
apply, except that the fee on any amount recovered by settlement without trial shall
not exceed 25%.
N.J. CT. R. 1:21-7(c). Paragraph (f) explains the procedure an attorney must follow in order
to appeal a contingent fee award. Id.
62. N.J. CT. R. 1:2 1-7(e).
63. Id.
64. N.Y. CT. R. § 603.7(e)1.
65. N.Y. CT. R. § 603.3.7(e)(2) (i)-(iii).
66. N.Y. CT. R. § 603.7(e)(2). The fixed percentage fee (not to exceed 33 1/30%0) is computed on
the net sum recovered after deducting enumerated expenses.
* A.B., Wesleyan College, 1977; A.M., Duke University, 1978; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law
School, 1988.
[Vol. 14:266
